Consequently, Maimonides argues that God brings about multiple actions and effects through his will, which is contained in his essence but not as a property, and that the multiplicity of effects or actions does not entail a multiplicity of powers in God.
Linguistic reductionism does not seek to explain religious belief but identifies a reductive class of sentences by which the truth or falsity of sentences in the disputed class is determined. Phillips, and in an exam you can usually talk about the two together. But apparently they are unwilling to allow anything to count against these claims.
He is, rather, expressing a "picture preference. The nature of the "something" is deliberately left vague. Rey suggests a number of reasons: Berkeley does not, therefore, have a successful method Religious language discriminating religious ideas and thoughts that are cognitively contentful from those that are not.
Wittgenstein is sometimes criticised as proposing that religious discourse should be quarantined from other areas of discourse, in particular science and history.
Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact of existence? Moreover, he cannot make explicit what likeness holds between Religious language and creatures because all names fall short of him.
Analogy of Proportion To understand the nature of God, it is best to use the analogy of proportion. The fourth solution suggests that the attributes predicated of God are to be interpreted analogously.
Speakers in many cases appear to believe what they are saying about God. Unlike other positions considered in this section, religious reductionists agree with face value theories that religious utterances have propositional content, however, they argue that the content in question is not the face value subject matter but instead the subject matter described by the reduced class of sentences.
But please remember that, as yet, no conceptual or grammatical clarification has taken place. Consequently, Aquinas argues that one should look for a means of naming God that does not fall prey to these problems and that is in keeping with religious practices.
But do these myths truly convey objective truths? It is possible to argue that religious utterances conventionally express both non-cognitive attitudes and beliefs for a defence of this position see Scott Our ordinary psychological terms carry no implications as to the intrinsic nature of the structure, its neurophysiological or soul-stuff character.
A statement is true if it fits in with other statements about the world i. The statement is factual if it cannot be falsified using sense experience. Obviously, if we take verification and falsification to their logical conclusion, we find ourselves precluded from saying almost anything about metaphysical matters and indeed God at all.
Indeed, the attention that some theories of religious language receive is in part due to their divergence from a face value interpretation. Supernatural deities have often been thought of as dealing in a fairly predictable way with contingencies in the natural world and human society.
Fragmentary accounts of truth of the kind that Phillips appears to endorse have been widely criticised—see, for example, Timothy Williamson Thus, on this view, psychological concepts are functional in the same way as many concepts of artifacts, for example, the concept of a loudspeaker.
In the metaphoric statement, knit is used in its usual Religious language to depict a certain kind of situation that, as a whole, is presented as an analogue of the effect of sleep on care.
In the debate about religious language, it is important that broadly speaking, there are two types of language, cognitive and non-cognitive. These two types of language are important for understanding the problems raised by the religious language debate.
This raises the problem of how and whether God can be meaningfully spoken about at all,  which causes problems for religious belief since the ability to describe and talk about God is important in religious life. From this starting point, attention has focused on how to apply the rich resources of research on names from the philosophy of language to this case.May 08, · He said that religious language is rooted in the language of mythology, and said that myths are ways of trying to explain something through the use of storytelling - a fictional story conveying an objective truth.
• Religious language has meaning and can be verified because it causes change in behaviour and a moral Religious language is meaningful because of its consequences.
• The difference in people's lives, is the verification of religious language. The problem of religious language also provides a challenge for philosophers of religion.
If there is no adequate solution to the problem of religious language, large discussions in the domain of philosophy of religion will also be rendered unintelligible. May 08, · (bullet points = weaknesses/criticisms) There are two main approaches to religious language (and they also serve as buzzwords.
RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE. Utterances made in religious contexts are of many sorts. In the performance of public and private worship men engage in acts of praise, petition, thanks, confession, and exhortation.
Religion, after all, is apparently a near-universal in human societies, like language, so perhaps there is a "deep structure" for religion just as there seems to be for language. Language and religion as .Download